Immanuel Kant is traditionally criticized for having a cold and austere view of the moral life, a view that leaves no room for feeling and neglects the value of human relationships. Friedrich Schiller once joked that to do good to one’s friends one must despise them entirely, if one is to be consistent with Kant’s ethics. Recent scholarship has sought to show that Kant has a much warmer view of human sentiment, requiring us, for example, to express sympathetic feeling and participate in the feelings of others. This effort is well placed, but it can obscure the features of his account which make it an interesting contribution to 18^th Century conceptions of sympathy. In this paper, I will define and explain these features of Kant’s conception of sympathy. I will draw some comparisons with two prominent 18^th Century accounts, from David Hume and Adam Smith, respectively. I will argue that Kant’s account possesses several key advantages.